

# Adaptive measures in responding to the Mw 6.9 Earthquake in Cebu, Philippines

Gerald Potutan<sup>1)</sup>  
 Koji Suzuki<sup>2)</sup>  
 Makoto Ikeda<sup>3)</sup>  
 Naoki Yamaguchi<sup>4)</sup>

**Abstract:** In the immediate aftermath of the Mw 6.9 Cebu Earthquake, the local systems for evacuation, assessment of building damage, and provision of financial support to victims faced challenges. Schools, gymnasiums, and other designated evacuation centers incurred damages and deemed unsafe. Local officials, assigned to assess the structural integrity of buildings, could not be mobilized. The administrative procedure for accessing financial assistance on housing recovery requires information, which could be have been easily collected with effective database system. In view of these, the impacted local governments, in collaboration with the Office of the President, implemented temporary adaptive measures to keep the disaster management system working and to alleviate the suffering of victims, prevent further damage to properties, reduce economic losses, and save lives and livelihoods. This paper explores the challenges faced by local systems for disaster response and early recovery as well as the adaptive measures taken during this event.

Keywords: Local Disaster Management System, Mw 6.9 Cebu Earthquake, Adaptive Measures

## 1. INTRODUCTION

A [Mw 6.9](#) earthquake jolted Cebu Province, Philippines at 21:59 on 30 September 2025. As reported by the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and Seismology (PHIVOLCS), this earthquake was caused by an offshore fault that had been dormant for over 400 years. The epicenter was located near [Bogo City](#) in northern Cebu (Figure 1), occurring at a shallow depth, about five kilometers, causing strong and intense shaking that resulted in significant destruction, such as building collapse, road damage, and power outage ([PHIVOLCS, 2025](#)).




Figure 1 Map of Cebu Province showing the location of the epicenter and intensity levels in affected areas (Source: PHIVOLCS, 2025)

Also, as shown in Figure 1, the local governments that experienced intense shaking, measured using the PHIVOLCS Earthquake Intensity Scale or [PEIS](#), include the following:

- Bogó City (PEIS = VIII “Very Destructive”)
- San Remigio (PEIS = VIII “Very Destructive”)
- Medellín (PEIS = VII “Destructive”)
- Daanbantayan (PEIS =VII “Destructive”)

Based on the official report from the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council ([NDRRMC](#), 2025), 79 people were killed, 559 injured, and 754,733 affected in 18 of the [53](#) primary local government units (i.e., 44 municipalities, 6 component cities, and 3 highly-urbanized cities) of Cebu Province. Considering the extent of the damage, the national government, led by the Office of the President, took part in emergency response and early recovery operations, including the conduct of cabinet meeting in Bogó City ([RTVM](#), 2025). During this meeting, various disaster management challenges were reported, including those related to evacuation centers, offices, churches, housing, and roads. It is in this context that the national government intervened in the response and early recovery operations. Under this situation, the following questions may be explored: What happened to the local disaster management system? Did the local disaster management system operate as envisioned in the law? While many online materials can provide answers to these questions, how the local governments adapt in the face of these pressing challenges need to be observed onsite.

### **(1) Objectives**

The objective of the field visit was to observe the situation, through visual assessment, focusing on the temporary adaptive measures undertaken by the local governments to address the challenges in disaster management during response and early recovery phases. The field visit was an opportunity to observe and take photos of the adaptive measures pertaining to:

- evacuation centers
- emergency relief
- temporary shelters and structures
- housing damage and financial assistance

### **(2) Methodology**

In line with its mandate to collect and share disaster information among its member countries and partner organizations, the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC), through one of its researchers, conducted a field visit to the earthquake-affected local governments of Cebu Province on 22 November 2025. The ADRC researcher, accompanied by the local official from Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) visited Bogó City, San Remigio, and Medellín – three of the most impacted local governments. During the visit, the researcher took photos of the temporary adaptive measures, interviewed a camp manager of tent city, and interacted with some of the earthquake victims.

## **2. DISASTER MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND LOCAL CHALLENGES**

The Philippine Disaster Management Act of 2010 (RA 10121) outlines the disaster risk reduction and management (DRRM) framework of the country. Under this law, the DRRM system is structured around four pillars: 1) Prevention and Mitigation – identifying risks and implementing measures to reduce hazard impact, e.g., land-use planning, infrastructure standards, environmental management; 2) Preparedness – building readiness to respond effectively, e.g., evacuation plans, drills, early warning systems; 3) Response – undertaking immediate actions during emergencies, e.g., search and rescue, relief distribution, medical assistance; and 4) Rehabilitation and Recovery – rebuilding and reconstructing communities and infrastructure. This DRRM system is considered proactive and comprehensive, as it shifted from a reactive (i.e., relief-centric model) to a preemptive approach. It

focuses on risk reduction, mitigation, and community-based preparedness rather than just emergency response.

**(1) Institutional Structure**

At the national level, the NDRRMC serves as the central coordinating body. It is headed by the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND) as Chairperson. Under the chairperson are four vice-chairpersons for each pillar: 1) the Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, 2) the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Preparedness, 3) the Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) as Vice Chairperson for Disaster Response, and 4) the Secretary of the Department of Economy Planning and Development (DEPDev) – formerly, the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) – as Vice-Chairperson for Disaster Rehabilitation and Recovery. Members of NDRRMC include representatives from other government institutions, private sector, and civil society organizations (Figure 2). The operational arm of NDRRMC is the Office of Civil Defense (OCD), which also serves as its Secretariat.




Figure 2 Organizational structure of NDRRMC (Source: OCD, 2025)

At the local levels (i.e., Province, City, Municipality, and Barangay), the disaster management system is replicated (or mirrored) from the NDRRMC structure, and generally called as Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Councils (LDRRMCs). The provinces have their respective Provincial DRRM Councils (PDRRMCs), the cities and municipalities have their respective City/Municipal DRRM Councils (C/MDRRMCs), and the barangays (villages) have their respective Barangay DRRM Committees (BDRRMCs). As shown in Table 1, the governor, mayor, or barangay captain serves as the Chairperson of the respective LDRRMCs, and the local department heads respectively serve as pillar leads (i.e., Prevention & Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery).

Table 1 Institutional arrangements for DRRM in the Philippines

Level	Chair	Operational Arm	Pillar Leads
<b>National (NDRRMC)</b>	Secretary of DND	Office of Civil Defense	DOST, DILG, DSWD, DEPDev
<b>Provincial</b>	Governor	Provincial DRRM Office	Local department heads
<b>City/Municipal</b>	Mayor	City/Municipal DRRM Office	Local department heads
<b>Barangay</b>	Barangay Captain	Barangay DRRM Committee	Barangay officials

In principle and in practice, the local government is the frontline for disaster management. However, when the local government can no longer cope with the impacts of the disaster using its own resources, disaster management operation escalates to the next higher level (Figure 3).

Barangay → City/Municipality → Province → Region → National (NDRRMC)

Figure 3 Escalation flow of disaster management in the Philippines

Considering local capacity, the disaster management operation escalates when: 1) personnel, equipment, and funds are insufficient; 2) evacuation centers exceed safe capacity; 3) search and rescue needs exceed the number of trained responders; 4) DRRM funds are exhausted; and 5) essential services (e.g., water, power, hospitals) collapse beyond local government's ability to repair.

## (2) Challenges

As mandated by law (RA 10121), the functions of the LDRRMCs include: 1) developing Local DRRM Plans based on local hazards, vulnerabilities, and capacities; 2) conducting public awareness programs and drills; 3) coordinating local response efforts and mobilizing resources during disasters; and 4) facilitating evacuations, relief distribution, and community training. Under the same law, each local government should allocate 5% of its annual revenue for DRRM to fully implement the mandated functions. Moreover, members of the NDRRMC (e.g., DOST, DILG, DSWD, and DEPDev) shall provide technical and financial assistance to the local governments.

Despite these mandated funding and national agencies' support, many local governments still struggle to fully implement its DRRM functions. Firstly, for smaller and poorer local governments (like most of those impacted by the Mw 6.9 earthquake), the 5% Local DRRM Fund (LDRRMF) would still be insufficient to cover all necessary activities for mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In fact, [records](#) from Commission on Audit show that many local governments failed to utilize their allocated disaster funds, hindering the development of resilient infrastructure and community preparedness (Rappler, 2025). Secondly, a [study](#) by Marchezini et. al. (2025) found that many local governments do not have permanent officers dedicated to DRRM functions. Instead, local governments just assign existing staffers to take the job on top of their other responsibilities. Without dedicated officers for DRRM functions, other officers who lack technical skills to assess risk, hazards, and vulnerabilities are assigned to take the role leading to poor implementation of DRRM activities. Thirdly, there are inadequate facilities for evacuation centers. Not only that local governments lack the necessary equipment for search and rescue and communications gear, but they also rely on schools, churches, and covered courts as evacuation centers. The challenge is, local governments are discouraged from designating [schools](#) as evacuation centers.

## 3. ADAPTIVE MEASURES

Given the challenges faced by local governments concerning disaster risk reduction and management (DRRRM) functions, the authors visually observed the following temporary adaptive measures following the Mw 6.9 Earthquake in Cebu.

### (1) Use of tents, modular shelter units, and containers

Based on the most recent report (NDRRMC, 2025), a total of 955 buildings (i.e., schools, government office buildings, churches, and sports complexes) were damaged. Moreover, 160,662 houses were damaged (153,252 partially damaged and 7,410 totally damaged). Although some other buildings did not collapse, the structural integrity may be compromised and could potentially collapse – considering a series of [aftershocks](#). Under this situation, the local governments of Bogo City, San Remigio, and Medellin had utilized tents and containers as short-term adaptive measures for evacuation shelters (tent cities), offices, structure for church services, and sleeping lodges.

**Tent Cities:** All three local governments facilitated the installation of the tent cities with the support from the national government and non-governmental organizations (e.g., Red Cross). In Bogo City, “tent city” was established with 176 tents (Figure 4, left photo below provided by the Red Cross

camp manager) in Barangay Cogon on 4 October 2025. A total of 162 families occupied the tents since 7 October 2025. However, during the field visit, the tent city was already dismantled (Figure 4, left photo above) due to typhoon [Kalmaegi](#) (local name, Tino) that landed on 4 November 2025. The victims were instructed to return to their partially damaged homes or stay with their relatives, whose houses are deemed safe. In San Remigio, the “tent city”, including the prefabricated modular shelter units (MSU), was installed on 5 October 2025 at the [Bayanihan Village](#) for 100 families. Occupants of the tents are victims whose houses were partially damaged (Figure 4, middle photo above) while the occupants of the MSUs are victims whose houses were totally damaged (Figure 4, middle photo below). In Medellin, the “tent city” was established with 63 tents on 4 October 2025. The victims started occupying them on 11 October 2025. However, during the field visit, the tent city was already



Figure 4 Tents and modular shelter units (MSUs) installed in the three impacted local governments of Cebu dismantled due to typhoon Tino. As shown in Figure 4 (lower right photo), the local government of Medellin also facilitated the installation of modular shelter units.

**Temporary Offices:** Local government office buildings in Bogo City, San Remigio, and Medellin incurred damage – and deemed unsafe for use based on visual assessment. For continuity of operations and services, local governments used tents and containers as temporary offices before transitioning to safer and permanent office buildings (Figure 5).



Figure 5 Damaged local government office buildings (above photos); tents and containers as temporary offices (below photos)

The Bogo City Hall was severely damaged (Figure 5, left upper photo). To continue its operations, the city government installed tents as temporary offices of various departments (Figure 5, left lower photo). Office buildings for some departments of the local government of San Remigio was damaged (Figure 5, middle upper photo) and tents were installed as temporary offices. The town hall of the local government of Medellin incurred damage and was deemed unsafe for usage (Figure 5, right upper photo). Containers were installed to serve as temporary offices, such as for mayor’s office (Figure 5, right lower photo).

**Temporary structures for church services:** As visually observed during the field visit, the earthquake brought structural damage to churches in Bogo City, San Remegio, and Medellin. As short-term adaptive measure, tents were installed beside the damaged churches to serve as temporary structures for church services, such as Sunday masses, thanksgiving, and baptism (Figure 6).

Historically, Cebu was one of the first islands colonized by Spain in the 1500s, making the island home to many old Catholic churches. In Bogo City, the Archdiocesan Shrine of San Vicente Ferrer (established in 1850) was severely damaged (Figure 6, left upper photo). Tents were installed beside the shrine to continue church services (Figure 6, left lower photo). In San Remigio, the San Juan Nepomuceno Parish Church (established in 1864) also incurred damage (Figure 6, middle upper photo). Tents were installed beside the church to continue church services (Figure 6, middle lower photo). In Medellin, the Santo Niño Parish Church (established in 1870s) likewise incurred damage (Figure 6, right upper photo). Tents were installed beside the church to continue church services (Figure 6, right lower photo).



Figure 6 Damaged churches (above photos); Tents for church services (below photos)

**Sleeping lodges:** As observed, local governments allowed their residents to privately install tents. In Bogo City for instance, some residents whose houses incurred partial damage opted to sleep in makeshift tents at night (Figure 7). When asked, “Why would you privately make a tent as sleeping lodge?” One of the residents responded, “Since there are still many aftershocks, my family decided to sleep in the tent at night for safety. However, in the daytime, we return to our own house because we are awake to notice and protect ourselves from the aftershocks.” As seen from the photos, this type of short-term adaptive measure by residents entails additional efforts, including water supply, food, utensils, and some sleeping materials.



Figure 7 Makeshift tents serving as night sleeping lodges by some residents

### (2) Water supply

DSWD (2025) reported that water supply lines in Bogo City, San Remigio, and Medellin were damaged, causing critical water shortages in the villages. During the field visit, the water system was not yet fully restored. In Bogo City for instance, many villages did not have running water for the households. As a short-term adaptive measure, the local government supplied water to the affected villages through the City Government tanker truck. After knowing the delivery schedules, residents of the impacted villages put their water containers along the roadside to be filled with water (Figure 8).



Figure 8 Water containers along the roadside of Barangay Dakit, Bogo City

### (3) Online and modular learning

As visually observed at the sites, the school buildings in Bogo City, San Remigio, and Medellin incurred damaged and are deemed unsafe for usage considering aftershocks. Based on the assessment by the Department of Education (DepED), 1,187 schools (with a total of 5,587 classrooms) sustained minor damage from the earthquake (Inquirer, 2025). The photos shown in Figure 8 are Hagnaya Integrated School in San Remigio (left photo) and Medellin Central Elementary School in Medellin (right photo). Although the school buildings did not collapse, visible cracks on the walls could be observed. To ensure safety, the local governments need to collaborate with DepEd in conducting “structural integrity” assessment of school buildings prior to reuse.

As a short-term adaptive measure, most elementary schools and some high schools implemented a “modular learning” approach. According to the mothers, whom the author met at the “tent city” in San Remigio, their children received sets of printed learning materials called “Self-Learning Modules”, where students can study independently and submit their outputs to the teachers for evaluation. Students are then graded based on their performance in completing the modules. In Bogo City, Mr. Jim Pevida (Camp Manager, Tent City by Red Cross), said that DepED has set up “Temporary Learning Spaces” (TLS) using tents to enable face-to-face classes for some elementary students. In areas, where electricity is restored, secondary schools implemented “online classes”.



Figure 9 Left photo: Hagnaya Integrated School in San Remigio. Right photo: Medellin Central Elementary School in Medellin

#### (4) Relaxation of safety regulations

Under the disaster risk reduction and management framework, and as [ordered](#) by the DILG, local government officers (i.e., building officials, engineers, and fire protection officers) must conduct rapid and thorough inspection of buildings prior to re-occupation as well as inspection of roads prior to reusage to ensure structural integrity and safety. As visually observed during the field visit, the impacted local governments relaxed the implementation of the order for lack of local officers capable of performing the inspections. As a short-term adaptive measure, local governments temporarily allow reoccupying commercial buildings and reusage of roads prior to having thorough inspection to address the basic needs of victims and communities (Figure 10).



Figure 10 Reoccupied buildings and reusage roads prior to thorough inspection by local government

Shown in Figure 10 are photos of the reoccupied commercial buildings in Santo Rosario, Bogo City (left photos up and down), reoccupied house in Poblacion, Medellin (middle photo up), reusage bridge in Luy-a, Medellin (middle down), and reusage roads in La Purisma, Bogo City (right photos up and down).

#### (5) Immediate release of housing aid

As a government policy, the National Housing Authority (NHA) – an institution under the Department of Human Settlements and Urban Development (DHSUD) – shall provide cash assistance to families whose homes are damaged by disasters through the Emergency Housing Aid Program (EHAP). There are two levels of assistance under EHAP: Level 1 – Family with totally damage house will receive thirty thousand Philippine Peso (PHP30,000); and Level 2 – Family with partially damage house will receive ten thousand Philippine Peso (PHP10,000). To access the funds, the local government shall coordinate with the NHA and DSWD in fulfilling the following tasks: identifying the beneficiaries, assessing the level of assistance, and distributing the financial assistance.

According to some of the beneficiaries interviewed during the field visit, the local governments negotiated with NHA-DHSUD to immediately release, as first tranche, PHP10,000 for families with totally damaged houses and PHP 5,000 for families with partially damaged houses based only on the visual assessment and list of beneficiaries. The second tranche of payment will be released following official assessment of housing damage. The immediate partial release of housing aid is a temporary adaptive measure facilitated by the local governments. During the field visit, the author took some photos of “totally damaged” houses (Figure 11, left photos) and “partially damaged” houses (Figure 11, right photos) based on visual observation.



Figure 11 Photos of “totally damaged” houses (left), and photos of “partially damaged” houses (right) based on visual observation only

## 4. DISCUSSIONS

Following the Mw 6.9 Earthquake in Cebu, the Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., in his message on 19 October 2025, urged Filipinos to be more prepared for disasters. The President recognizes the reality that Filipinos are experiencing a series of disasters annually, and he said that “beyond response and recovery, disaster preparedness should be second nature to us” ([Inquirer](#), 2025). After observing the temporary adaptive measures in the earthquake impacted areas, it can be inferred that many local governments and communities did not fully demonstrate the characteristics of having

disaster preparedness as “second nature”. Among the apparent limitations observed during the field visit, include the absence of permanent evacuation centers, lack of capable local officials to perform thorough structural integrity inspections, low utilization of the LRDRRM Fund, and lack of disaggregated data system for victims in accessing financial aid.

Here are some options for moving forward.

### **(1) Establishment of permanent evacuation centers**

As observed during the field visit, there were respectively no permanent evacuation centers established by the local governments of Bogo City, San Remigio, and Medellin. This is one of the limitations in emergency response operations. To address this, it is timely for these local governments to comply with the [Republic Act 12076](#) “An Act Establishing Evacuation Centers for Every City and Municipality and Appropriating Funds Therefor”, which was enforced in December 2024. This law mandates the construction of permanent evacuation centers in every city and municipality in the Philippines. The permanent evacuation centers are designed to withstand 300 kph typhoon winds and 8.0 magnitude earthquakes, replacing the practice of using schools as temporary shelters.

The permanent evacuation centers could systematically provide secure and fully equipped temporary accommodation for victims of the earthquake, ensuring they are safe and dignified. Unlike the sports complexes that incurred damage during the earthquake (Figure 12), the permanent evacuation centers are established with high safety standards, and built with durable materials, that can withstand Mw 8 earthquakes.



Figure 12 Sports complex in San Remigio (left), Sports center in Bogo City (right)

### **(2) Capacity improvement of LDRRMOs**

One of the root causes why the local governments of Bogo City, San Remigio, and Medellin relaxed the safety regulations (e.g., thorough inspection prior to providing permits for re-occupying buildings or reusing roads) after the earthquake is the lack of local officers who can perform the inspections. In this regard, the capacity of LDRRMOs, particularly in safety inspections, must be improved, as relaxing safety regulations poses significant risk. As observed, local governments permit victims to reoccupy their houses despite insufficient official inspections. As a result, some victims occupied their houses during daytime believing that they can be safer from aftershocks when awake. In reality, this is a misunderstanding since houses that did not undergo official structural integrity assessment pose threat regardless of whether its day or night. Although victims believe that they can safely escape during daytime, a sudden collapse caused by an aftershock would make evacuation nearly impossible. The intersection between “administrative tolerance” to reoccupy the houses and the victims “misunderstanding of safety” calls for capacity improvement of LDRRMOs.

There are many entry points to increase the capacity of LDRRMOs. First, local governments need to increase their utilization of the LRDRRM Fund (which is 5% of annual revenue) and use it to train local officers in conducting inspections. Second, strengthen collaboration with the national line agencies, such as DOST, DILG, DSWD, DND, and DEPDeV to access their tools and manuals for disaster risk assessment, mitigation strategies, and early recovery. Third, local governments need to invest in maintaining disaggregated data in their respective localities to make the response and recovery measures strategically targeted.

### (3) Embracing space technology for DRR, including those promoted by ADRC

Prior to visiting the earthquake impacted areas in Cebu, ADRC was aware that [Sentinel Asia](#) provided satellite imageries and value-added products to inform the response plan of the national and local governments. The provision of the analyzed disaster assessment maps (Figure 13) through the Sentinel Asia was one of the contributions from Japan. Using the information from disaster assessment maps, planners and responders were able to assess (by proxy) the extent of damage in particular areas. It facilitated strategic targeting of relief, response, and recovery operations. In producing the disaster assessment map, the satellite imageries of an impacted area were taken before the event and compared them with the satellite imageries of the same area after the event to determine surface changes. In disaster assessment map of Cebu earthquake below, the color from yellow to red indicates an increasingly significant ground surface change before and after the event. Areas in red indicate greater changes, implying a higher likelihood of damage to structures such as buildings, while areas in yellow represent smaller changes. The disaster assessment maps from Sentinel Asia were useful to the local governments in the following ways: 1) it shows the locations that need to be prioritized for response and early recovery, 2) it is linked to web GIS, determining the types of infrastructures and services affected, and 3) it shows the before-and-after satellite images, which is useful for recovery planning.




Figure 13 Disaster Assessment Map of Cebu Earthquake using Satellite Imagery  
(Source: Sentinel Asia 2025)

## 5. CONCLUSIONS

Following the field visit, this research found that the three severely impacted local governments in Cebu (i.e., Bogo City, San Remigio, and Medellin) were facing difficult challenge in managing the impact of the earthquake. First is the absence of permanent evacuation centers that could withstand a Mw 8.0 earthquake. Since the “structural integrity” of sports complexes and schools was compromised, including vulnerability to aftershocks, victims must wait for days until the tent cities were installed. In the absence of permanent evacuation centers, the utilization of tents served as temporary adaptive measures. However, these measures should not replace the establishment of a more resilient and permanent evacuation centers as mandated by law. Second is limited capacities of the Local Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Offices (LDRRMOs) in inspecting the structural integrity of buildings and infrastructures. This limitation caused the local governments to relax safety regulations that could substantially increase the pre-existing vulnerabilities. Third is regarding the management

of local socio-economic data, where maintaining disaggregated is useful to specifically target the needs of victims (e.g., needs of elderly, children, and women), including access to financial support.

It can be concluded that due to the abovementioned disaster management challenges, the local governments have implemented temporary adaptive measures during the response and early recovery phases of managing the impacts of the Mw 6.9 earthquake in Cebu.

## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are grateful to the Asian Disaster Reduction Center (ADRC) for facilitating the field visit to the earthquake impacted areas of Cebu. The authors would like to acknowledge the support of Mr. Rey Pacres of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) Cebu, Mr. Jim Pevida of the Red Cross camps, and the local government officials, victims, and volunteers whom we interacted during the field visit.

## REFERENCES

- DSWD. Dromic Report No 35 on the Effects of Mw 6.9 Earthquake in the City of Bogo, Cebu. Available online: <https://dromic.dswd.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/DSWD-DROMIC-Report-35-on-the-Effects-of-Magnitude-6.9-Earthquake-in-the-City-of-Bogo-Cebu-as-of-24-October-2025-6AM.docx.pdf> (accessed 10 February 2026).
- Inquirer. Bad classrooms, broken dreams. Available online: <https://opinion.inquirer.net/186665/bad-classrooms-broken-dreams> (accessed 12 February 2026).
- Marchezini, V. et.al. Implementation challenges of disaster risk management policies: The organizational capacities of municipal civil defense units. Available online: <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S2212420925001153> (accessed 24 January 2026).
- NDRRMC. Effects of Mw 6.9 Earthquake Situation Report No. 24. Available online: [https://ndrrmc.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Situational\\_Report\\_No\\_24\\_for\\_the\\_Effects\\_of\\_Magnitude\\_6\\_9\\_Earthquake\\_in\\_Bogo\\_City\\_Cebu\\_20251.pdf](https://ndrrmc.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/Situational_Report_No_24_for_the_Effects_of_Magnitude_6_9_Earthquake_in_Bogo_City_Cebu_20251.pdf) (accessed 10 February 2026).
- OCD. Organizational Structure of NDRRMC. Available online: <https://ocd.gov.ph/drrm-knowledge-downloadables/> (accessed 8 December 2025).
- PHIVOLCS. PHIVOLCS Earthquake Intensity Scale (PEIS). Available online: <https://www.phivolcs.dost.gov.ph/phivolcs-earthquake-intensity-scale-peis/> (accessed 10 February 2026).
- PHIVOLCS. Primer on the 30 September 2025 Mw 6.9 Offshore Northern Cebu Earthquake. Available online: <https://www.phivolcs.dost.gov.ph/press-release-primer-on-the-30-september-2025-magnitude-mw-6-9-offshore-northern-cebu-earthquake/> (accessed 4 February 2026).
- PIA. DILG orders immediate structural inspections in the earthquake-hit areas of Cebu. Available online: <https://pia.gov.ph/news/dilg-orders-immediate-structural-inspections-in-earthquake-hit-areas-in-cebu-and-mindanao/> (accessed 20 February 2026).
- Rappler. Lost opportunity: COA calls out 70 LGUs over low disaster fund use. Available online: <https://www.rappler.com/philippines/coa-special-audit-report-local-disaster-risk-reduction-management-fund-2024/> (accessed 4 February 2026).
- RTVM. San Remegio Tent City “Bayanihan Village”. Available online: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T54ueNRPuTQ> (accessed 5 February 2026).
- RTVM. Situation Briefing on the Effects of the 6.9-Magnitude Earthquake in the Province of Cebu. Available online: <https://rtvm.gov.ph/situation-briefing-on-the-effects-of-the-6-9-magnitude-earthquake-in-the-province-of-cebu/> (accessed 9 February 2026).
- Sentinel Asia. Flood Due to Typhoon KALMAEGI in Philippines on 04 November, 2025. Available online: <https://sentinel-asia.org/EO/2025/article20251104PH.html> (accessed 12 February 2026).
- Supreme Court e-library. [Republic Act 12076](#) : An Act Establishing Evacuation Centers for Every City and Municipality and Appropriating Funds Therefor”. Available online: <https://elibrary.judiciary.gov.ph/thebookshelf/showdocs/2/98122> (accessed 10 February 2026).

**Authors:** 1) Senior Researcher, Asian Disaster Reduction Center, Visiting Associate Professor, Research Center for Urban Safety and Security (RCUSS), Kobe University; 2) Project Director, Asian Disaster Reduction Center, Visiting Professor, RCUSS, Kobe University; 3) Senior Researcher, Asian Disaster Reduction Center, Visiting Associate Professor, Research Center for Urban Safety and Security (RCUSS), Kobe University; 4) Senior Researcher, Asian Disaster Reduction Center, Visiting Associate Professor, Research Center for Urban Safety and Security (RCUSS), Kobe University.

© 2026 Research Center for Urban Safety and Security, Kobe University, All rights reserved.